Domestic Telecommunications Policy:
An Overview by Phillips,, Charles F., Jr.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 29 | Issue 2 Article 3
Fall 9-1-1972
Domestic Telecommunications Policy: An
Overview
Charles F. Phillips, Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Communications Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles F. Phillips, Jr., Domestic Telecommunications Policy: An Overview, 29 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 235
(1972), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol29/iss2/3
DOMESTIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY: AN
OVERVIEW
CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR.*
Prior to World War II, the domestic public message system was
divided into voice and record communications. The for-
mer-telephone-was supplied by the American Telephone and Tele-
graph Company (AT&T) and by hundreds of independent telephone com-
panies. The latter-telegraph-was supplied by Western Union Tele-
graph Company and the Postal Telegraph Company.' After the war,
however,
the market for communication services changed greatly. The de-
mand for telephone services rose steeply while the demand for
public message telegraph services declined sharply. In addition,
demands increased for new types of communication services which
had been developed to meet the needs of far-flung business firms:
teletypewriter exchange, alternate voice/record, and voice/data
services.
2
The demand for new types of bulk communications services, com-
bined with continuous technologicf change, have confronted policymak-
ers with a series of issues affecting the structure of the telecommuni-
cations industry. Stated briefly, new markets and new potential suppliers
have raised the possibility of rendering obsolete the traditional natural
monopoly concept. Perhaps the threshold issues concern the extent to
which competition should be encouraged and, if it is to be allowed, then
it becomes necessary to determine just how competition is to be accom-
modated within a regulatory framework. It is the purpose of this article
to analyze these basic issues.
I. THE TRADITIONAL RATIONALE OF REGULATION
The classic economic explanation of the need for extensive regulation
of public utilities is that such businesses are "natural monopolies." The
phrase, as James R. Nelson has pointed out, is misleading.
One of the most unfortunate phrases ever introduced into law or
economics was the phrase "natural monopoly." Every monopoly
*Professor of Economics, Washington and Lee University. B.A. 1956, University of
New Hampshire; Ph.D. 1960, Harvard University.
'The telephone companies also leased private lines to their customers for various pur-
poses, including record services, and offered teletypewriter exchange service.
2
K. BORCHARDT, STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE U.S. COMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRY 25-26 (1970). In 1943, Western Union acquired Postal Telegraph.
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is a product of public policy. No present monopoly, public or
private, can be traced back through history in a pure form....
. . ."natural monopolies" in fact originated in response to a belief
that some goal, or goals, of public policy would be advanced by
encouraging or permitting a monopoly to be formed, and discour-
aging or forbidding future competition with this monopoly.
3
For telephone and telegraph services, regulation is based on (1) the
existence of significant long-run economies of scale, so that one firm can
serve a given market at a lower average cost than can two or more
competing firms; (2) the necessarily close connection between the utility
plant and the subscribers' premises; and (3) the expense, inconvenience
and wastefulness to subscribers of parallel competing systems.4 Given
these economic characteristics, it can be demonstrated that unlimited
competition will result in inefficiency, poor quality, and high costs.5 Reg-
ulation, therefore, was conceived of as a substitute for competition and
was designed primarily to protect the consumer, as opposed to the inves-
tor, interest.6 In such cases, "the visible hand of public regulation was to
3Nelson, The Role of Competition in the Regulated Industries, I I ANTITRUST BULL.
3 (1966). On the early development of the structure of the domestic communications indus-
try see Trebing, Common Carrier Regulation-The Silent Crisis, 34 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 299, 302-07 (1969) (hereinafter Trebing).
On the natural monopoly concept see Brozen, Is Government the Source of
Monopoly?, THE INTERCOLLEGIATE REV. 67 (1969); Demetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, II
J. LAW & ECON. 55 (1968).
'There are other economic characteristics of importance: (I) Because a utility must
have adequate capacity to meet its subscribers' peak demand requirements, it tends to have
unused or surplus capacity much of the time. Competition may only serve to aggravate the
situation. (2) There is a large investment in fixed, and highly specialized, plant, representing
a significant percentage of a utility's total cost. (3) To the extent that it is supplying a basic
necessity, a utility has some control over the rates it charges subscribers (i.e., for some uses,
demand is inelastic). (4) Price differentiation or discrimination is both possible and gener-
ally attractive to a utility enterprise. With high fixed costs, unused capacity, and differences
in consumer demands, a single rate low enough to maintain full capacity output often fails
to yield revenues sufficient to cover costs, while one set high enough to cover costs may
result in unused capacity. See C. PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 20-31, 303-
10 (rev. ed. 1969).
5But see Gable, The Early Competitive Era in Telephone Communication, 1893-1920,
34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 340 (1969).
6J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 5 (1961). In the words of Ben
W. Lewis:
There is something quite special about governmental regulation of the
public utility type: this is the way we behave when we are really keyed up
about economizing, when we stop acquiescing and "going along," when
we feel quite certain that, for reasons we can identify, the processes of the
free market cannot be made satisfactorily to perform the economizing job
we want done and, hence, that we must perform the economizing functions
by specifically designed laws, agencies, and measures.
Lewis, Ambivalence in Public Policy Toward Regulated Industries, 53 ANI. ECON. REV. 38,
40 (Papers and Proceedings, May 1963).
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replace the invisible hand of Adam Smith in order to protect consumers
against extortionate charges, restriction of output, deterioration of serv-
ice, and unfair discrimination."
'7
To carry out the task of control, an elaborate regulatory system has
evolved. The basic focus of regulation is rate regulation; that is, supervi-
sion of a utility's revenue requirements8 and rate structures. Because of
the natural monopoly concept, the regulatory commissions were given by
statute the means of limiting (but not eliminating) competition: control
over entry, consolidations, and exit; power to prescribe minimum rates;
and authority over some aspects of service rivalry. The existence of regu-
lation thus represents a judgment either that competitive goals should be
subordinated to other goals in a given industry or that competitive goals
are better achieved by direct control over managerial decisions.9
As it has developed, regulation has sought competitive goals: reasona-
ble prices and profits, incentives to further technological progress, and
adequate and safe service. But the achievement of such goals is difficult.
As former FCC Commissioner Loevinger has argued:
The basic strength of the competitive system is that it avoids such
problems (i.e., the necessity of securing, organizing, and weighting
data adequate to make a complex economic decision) by
distributing market power among numerous diverse enterprises, so
that operation of the market rests upon the action of many inde-
pendent decision makers. The vice of monopoly is that it concen-
trates market power and thus eliminates the diverse independent
decision makers. . . . Regulation preserves a number of indepen-
dent decision makers, but it reduces the number from that which
might otherwise exist, and it concentrates decision-making power
with respect to the areas of regulatory control. The difficulty is
that no regulatory agency can acquire or utilize effectively the
range of data which influence a competitive market. Conse-
quently, the ability of regulation to substitute for competition has
an inherent limitation which cannot be wholly overcome by any
improvement in the regulatory structure or process."
The difficulty of achieving competitive goals arises from other sources
as well. Since competition throughout the economy is imperfect, it is not
7Adams, The Role of Competition in the Regulated Industries, 48 Am. ECON. REV.
527 (Papers and Proceedings, May 1958).
"A utility's annual revenue requirement is equal to its allowable operating expenses,
depreciation and taxes, plus a fair rate of return (profit) on its investment.
1C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
41 (1959).
I'Loevinger, Regulation and Competition as Alternatives, II ANTITRUST BULL. 101,
125 (1966).
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easy to specify with any precision that competitive standard which regula-
tion should seek. Since it must satisfy the requirements of due process
("investigate, give notice, hold hearings, study the record, make findings,
issue orders, permit appeals"") regulation is inherently slower than com-
petition. Since public policies are shaped by various economic, social, and
political pressures, regulation may seek different objectives than those
sought through competition, such as the rendition of socially desirable but
uneconomic services or the protection of certain industries. Finally, it is
difficult to adapt regulatory laws and concepts to meet changing eco-
nomic conditions.
12
I I. THE COMPETITIVE CHALLENGE
Few would argue that regulation has been a failure. Nevertheless,
criticism of both regulatory purposes and regulatory processes has inten-
sified in recent years. 13 Some have concluded that direct control over
entry, rates, and service is not worth the effort." Others have concluded
"
1
C. WILCOX, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 477 (3d ed. 1966).
'2Professor Rostow, for example, has argued that the statutes which our regulatory
agencies seek to enforce are
usually out of date, often confused, ill-drawn, and needlessly complex.
Many of their rules echo forgotten battles, and guard against dangers
which no longer exist. They comprise vast codes, understood only by a
jealous priesthood which protects these swamps and thickets from all
prying eyes. In the main, the agencies follow routines established for the
control of local gas companies and street railways. The relevance of the
model is not immediately apparent, in dealing with progressive and ex-
panding industries like air transport or trucking.
E. ROSTOW, PLANNING FOR FREEDOM 311-12 (1959).
" See P. MAcAVoy, THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSION (1970); R. NOLL,
REFORMING REGULATION (1971).
"Posner has concluded, for example, that
public utility regulation is probably not a useful exertion of governmental
powers; that its benefits cannot be shown to outweigh its costs; and that
even in markets where efficiency dictates monopoly we might do better
to allow natural economic forces to determine business conduct and per-
formance subject only to the constraints of antitrust policy.
Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 549 (1969). See also
three comments on Posner's article: Comanor, Should Natural Monopolies Be Regulated,
22 STAN. L. REV. 510 (1970); Swidler, Comments on the Case for Deregulation, 22 STAN.
L. REV. 519 (1970); Shepherd, Regulation and Its Alternatives, 22 STAN. L. REV. 529
(1970); and the author's reply, Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 540 (1970).
On the effectiveness of regulation see Jackson, Regulation and Electric Utility Rate
Levels, 45 L. & ECON. 372 (1969); Moore, The Effectiveness of Regulation of Electric
Utility Prices, 36 S. ECON. J. 365 (1970); Pike, Residential Electric Rates and Regulations,
7 Q. REV. ECON. & Bus. 45 (1967); Stigler & Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate?
The Case of Electricity, 5 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1962).
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that while direct control is worthwhile (or perhaps inevitable), present
regulatory policies do not promote maximum efficiency. 5 It is significant
to note that both groups contend that it would be highly desirable, as well
as possible, to rely more heavily upon the forces of competition to im-
prove the economic performance of the regulated industries.
In the post-war period, technological developments-along with con-
tinuous market growth-have confronted the established communica-
tions' common carriers with important competitive challenges. Micro-
wave transmission, communication satellites, and digital computers have
made possible new options for supplying communication services. In
addition, a successful attack on the telephone companies' long-standing
tariffs prohibiting foreign attachments has opened the equipment and
related hardware market to non-affiliated manufacturers. These develop-
ments have confronted the FCC, in particular, with the issue of deciding
to what extent competition should be encouraged. In its decisions to date,
the Commission has established a policy favoring competition.
The Above 890 Decision. Until 1959, the FCC licensed private micro-
wave communications systems to government and business units only
when they had "special communications needs," such as the lack of
common carrier facilities. Several companies announced plans to install
microwave systems between selected Eastern cities as early as 1946,16 but
it was not until 1956 that the competitive challenge from microwave
technology become of significance.17 In that year, the FCC was asked by
prospective private users for access to radio frequencies above 890 mega-
On cost-benefit analysis see A. FRIEDLANDER, THE DILEMMA OF FREIGHT TRANSPORT
REGULATION (1969); W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA (1970); Friedlander,
The Social Costs of Regulating the Railroads, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 226 (Papers and Pro-
ceedings, May 1971); MacAvoy, The Effectiveness of the Federal Power Commission, I
BELL J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 271 (1970); Nelson, Costs and Benefits of Regu-
lating Communications, 61 Am. ECON. REV. 218 (Papers and Proceedings, May 1971);
Sloss, Regulation of Motor Freight Transport: A Quantitative Evaluation of Policy, 1 BELL
J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT Sci. 327 (Fall 1970). See also Westfield, Methodology of Evalu-
ating Economic Regulation, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 211 (Papers and Proceedings, May 1971).
I5Averch & Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM.
ECON. REV. 1052 (1962); Wellisz, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipeline Companies: An
Economic Analysis, 71 J. POL. ECON. 30 (1963); Westfield, Regulation and Conspiracy, 55
AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1965). But see Bailey & Malone, Resource Allocation and the
Regulated Firm, I BELL J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 129 (Spring 1970); Hughes,
Performance Under Regulation, in RATE OF RETURN UNDER REGULATION, NEW DIREC-
TIONS AND PERSPECTIVES 73 (H. Trebing ed. 1969); Morton, Do Utilities Waste Capital?,
87 PuB. UTIL. FORT. 12 (1971).
'6Beelar, Cables in the Sky and the Struggle for Their Control, 21 FED. COM. B.J. 26,
27-33 (1967).
"Although the Bell System had been installing microwave since 1951, Trebing alleges
that the system responded to the initial challenge
with a massive effort to integrate microwave capability as a part of its
nationwide communications network. This was accomplished through a
1972]
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cycles to develop non-common carrier microwave service. The suppliers
of microwave equipment joined in the request.
The potential entrants contended that there were sufficient frequen-
cies available for both private and common carriers, and that private
entry would enhance consumer choice and promote competition in the
communications equipment market. The common carriers maintained
that the adequacy of the frequency spectrum was limited, so that the
frequencies available for common carriers might be insufficient for their
entire microwave installations and that private entry might result in inter-
ference. They also argued that private entrants would engage in cream-
skimming, by entering only on a selective basis. As a result, not only
would they lose significant revenues, but smaller users would be burdened
with higher rates since the overhead of the common carriers would be
distributed over a smaller number of customers.
On July 30, 1959, the Commission issued its Report and Order, in
which it removed all significant barriers to the installation and operation
of private microwave systems. 8 Concluded the Commission:
1. There are now available adequate frequencies above 890 Mc
to take care of present and reasonably foreseeable future needs of
both the common carriers and private users for point-to-point
communications systems, provided that orderly and systematic
procedures and proper technical criteria are applied in the issuance
of authorizations, and that implementation is consistently
achieved with respect to all available and future improvements in
the art. There is a demonstrated need for private point-to-point
communications systems. Accordingly, the decision looks toward
liberalization of the basis for issuance of such authorizations.
Availability of common carrier facilities will not be considered as
a condition of eligibility for such private users.
2. There is no basis for generally concluding that the licensing
of private communications systems would adversely affect, to any
substantial degree, the ability of common carriers to provide serv-
ice to the general public or adversely affect the users of such
common carrier service. Therefore, it is unnecessary to consider
whether such licensing is contrary to the public interest. 9
The MCI Decision. Microwave Communications, Inc. (MCI) filed
applications with the FCC for construction permits to provide point-to-
crash program which resulted in the development of TD-2 radio relay
facilities.
Trebing, supra note 3, at 308.
"Allocation of Microwave Frequencies Above 890 Mc., 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959), affd
on rehearing, 29 F.C.C. 825 (1960).
"FCC, REPORT No. 575 (1959).
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point radio microwave service from St. Louis to Chicago and nine inter-
mediate points. MCI did not propose a complete microwave service;
rather, it would require the subscriber to provide his own communications
link between the Company's sites and his place of business (i.e., loop
service). However, MCI contended that its rates would be substantially
lower than those charged by the common carriers, and that the service
would provide greater flexibility in terms of the use of facilities.
The common carriers (the Bell System, General Telephone, and West-
ern Union) objected to the applications on the following grounds: (1) that
MCI was not financially qualified to construct and operate the proposed
'facilities; (2) that MCI had failed to show a need for the services pro-
posed; (3) that MCI was unable to provide a reliable communications
service; (4) that the proposal represented an inefficient utilization of the
frequency spectrum; and (5) that the proposal was not technically feasi-
ble.20
The Commission granted the applications, finding: that MCI was
financially qualified; that a need existed for "microwave service of accept-
able quality at lower rates than offered by the existing carriers;"', that
the MCI proposal "may reasonably be expected to achieve a degree of
reliability which, while not matching the high degree of reliability claimed
by the major carriers, will provide an acceptable and a marketable com-
mon carrier service;"" and that the benefits of MCI's proposal "outweigh
the fact that MCI will not make the fullest possible use of its frequen-
cies." 3 The Commission admitted that the case was
very close. . . and one which presents exceptionally difficult ques-
tions . . . . However, it would be inconsistent with the public
interest to deny MCI's applications and thus deprive the applicant
of an opportunity to demonstrate that its proposed microwave
facilities will bring to its subscribers the substantial benefits which
it predicts and which we have found to be supported by the evi-
dence in this proceeding.24




241d. at 966. Commissioner Johnson, in a separate statement, said that he was still
looking "for ways to add a little salt and pepper of competition to the rather tasteless stew
of regulatory protection that this Commission and Bell have cooked up." Id. at 978.
The Commissions rather cautious approach proved to be short-lived. Within twelve
months
it was confronted with no fewer than thirty-seven applications by compa-
nies (ten of them associated with MCI), proposing to establish themselves
as specialized common carriers. The proposals involved construction of
1713 microwave stations, more than one-third the number in the entire
1972]
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The Computer Inquiry. The electronic computer can provide a wide
variety of data processing, computational, and information storage and
retrieval services to a large number of users at remote locations. It can
also be utilized by communications common carriers as part of their
networks as a message switching device. Thus, the convergence of com-
munications and computer technologies has made feasible the entry of
equipment manufacturers and other firms into supplying communications
systems and services, and the entry of common carriers into supplying
data processing and specialized information services.21 Summarizes the
FCC's Bernard Strassburg:
Inasmuch as computers have become standard communications
gear, the common carrier networks are no longer confining their
service offerings to purely communications service. Taking advan-
tage of the versatility and capacity of their computers, certain
carriers are now programming them to provide data processing
and information storage and retrieval services in combination with
their traditional communications services. At the same time, we
find that the nonregulated computer service bureaus, and other
entities providing specialized information services over communi-
cations channels leased from the carriers, are seeking to furnish
their customers with message switching services, an activity which
heretofore has been limited to the communications common car-
rier.21
In 1966 the Commission issued a Notice of Inquiry seeking to deline-
ate the main issues in the growing interrelationship between the commu-
Bell System. The most dramatic of these, submitted by Data Transmission
Co. (Datran), was for a $350,000,000 nation-wide switched network solely
for the transmission of data, providing end-to-end service in direct compe-
tition with the Bell System.
11 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMiCS OF REGULATION 135 (1971) (hereinafter KAHN).
Then, in mid-1971, the Commission announced a policy of free entry by new specialized
carriers which meet technical and financial standards. 37 TELECOMM. REP. I at 1-6, 29-33
(June 1, 1971).
"Western Union is in the process of establishing computer centers, but the Bell System
has not yet offered computer services. Under the terms of the 1956 consent decree, which
prohibits the Bell System's entrance into other than regulated common carrier offerings,
the System would have to tariff computer offerings and, as a result, might not be competi-
tive. United States v. Western Elec. Co., Civil No. 17-49 (D.N.J., filed Jan. 14, 1949). The
Final Judgment is reprinted in Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. II, vol. I at 1845-63 (1958).
21Strassburg, Communications and Computers: How Shall the Twain Meet?, 82 PuB.
UTIL. FORT. 69, 70 (Sept. 12, 1968). See also Irwin, Computer Utility: Competition or
Regulation, 76 YALE L.J. 1299 (1967); The Computer Utility: A Public Policy Overview,
in SELECTED STRUCTURE AND ALLOCATION PROBLEMS IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES I
(1969).
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nications and computer industriesY Interested parties were invited to
respond to a lengthy list of questions, after which the Commission en-
gaged the Stanford Research Institue (SRI) to prepare an analysis of the
issues.28 The end result, according to Harry Trebing,
was a series of self-serving declarations by the parties involved, an
abstract of these declarations by SRI, and a series of SRI-
sponsored papers which made little or no contribution to the litera-
ture on public utility economics, the organization of the industry,
or the task of regulation. Perhaps the most intriguing feature of
this entire process was the Justice Department presentation, which
argued that common carriers should not provide computer services
except through arm's length subsidiaries. Considering the difficul-
ties involved in assuring such a relationship, the Justice Depart-
ment response comes close to establishing a per se argument that
the common carriers be foreclosed from providing teleprocessing
services. At present, it appears that the FCC has most of the
distance to travel before an informed judgment can be made about
the relationship between common carriers and the computer indus-
try and the scope of regulation."
The Commission's Final Decision was issued in March of 1971. In
that decision, rules were adopted which prohibit common carriers (do-
mestic and international) from buying data processing services from their
own affiliates and which prohibit such data processing affiliates from
using their parents' names or obtaining promotional or other assistance
from them. Explained the FCC's majority:
The fundamental question raised . . . is whether the extent of
required separation between a carrier ind its data affiliate, as set
forth in the tentative decision, suffices to prevent any arbitrary
manipulation in the allocation of revenues and expenses between
carrier's regulated and unregulated service offerings.
The specialized and variant nature of the data processing serv-
ices, particularly with reference to costs and charges thereof, is
conducive to improprieties which are difficult to detect. Such im-
proprieties could translate into inflated charges to customers of a
"Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and
Communication Services and Facilities, Notice of Inquiry, 7 F.C.C. 2d 11 (1966); Supple-
mental Notice of Inquiry, 7 F.C.C.2d 19 (1966); Report and Further Notice of Inquiry, 17
F.C.C.2d 587 (1969); Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, and Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d
291 (1970); Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 269 (1971).
"Dunn et al., Stanford Research Institute Research Report Prepared For the FCC
(FCC Docket No. 16979, 1969). See also Dunn, Policy Issues Presented by the Interdepend-
ence of Computer and Communications Services, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 369 (1969).
2Trebing, supra note 3, at 324 (footnotes omitted).
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carrier's regulated services which, in turn, could lead to lengthy
administrative proceedings and other litigation.
At the same time, such improprieties could cause irreparable
harm to a carrier affiliate's data processing competitors and thus,
to the essentially competitive market within which data processing
service offerings currently exist. In other words, excessive pay-
ments by carriers to data processing affiliates would enable the
affiliates to unfairly underprice their own competitors in the data
processing market.
Since the basic objective of our policy herein is the deterrence
of foreseeable abuse from indirect carrier entry into data process-
ing, we shall amend our rules to include a provision prohibiting a
common carrier from obtaining any data processing service from
its data affiliate.
3 0
Foreign Attachments. For many years (and with certain exceptions),
telephone tariffs have prohibited the attachment of devices, other than
those supplied by telephone companies themselves, and the interconnec-
tion of customer-owned communications systems directly to the tele-
phone network. The purpose of this policy was to protect the integrity of
the network. In 1968, the FCC held that AT&T's existing tariff was
"unreasonable, discriminatory, and unlawful" since it prohibited "the use
of interconnecting devices which do not adversely affect the telephone
system." But the Commission said that telephone companies "may sub-
mit new tariffs which will protect the telephone system against harmful
devices, and may specify technical standards if they wish."'"
AT&T filed new tariffs in October of 1968 under which the telephone
network was opened to a wide variety of customer-provided equipment,
including the interconnection of most private systems. The new tariffs
contained the provision, however, that any network-controlled signalling
device (e.g., the ordinary telephone) had to be furnished, maintained, and
installed by the telephone company. After the Department of Justice
complained that the new tariffs did not comply fully with the Carterfone
1037 Telecom. Rep. 1, 7-8 (March 22, 1971). Argued Chairman Burch in his dissenting
statement:
It seems to me that we all re losers in this proceeding-the industry,
because in the name of com ietition, competition has been lessened; the
Commission, because its efforts to get on top of a problem before it
became a problem have come a cropper, the public generally, because they
will lose the benefits of competition; and common carrier users specifi-
cally, because they alone will lose the benefits of any lower prices other-
wise available from carrier affiliates.
Id. at 6.
3'Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 423, 426
(1968). See also Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
[Vol. XXIX
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decision, the Commission initiated a series of informal conferences, and
subsequently, two technical committees were appointed, to evaluate the
Company's foreign attachment and interconnection policies. These com-
mittes are to report to the Commission at some future date.
Domestic Communications Satellites. The Communications Satellite
Corporation (Comsat) was established by Congress in 1962 to set up an
international satellite system.32 At that time, the economic feasibility of
a domestic satellite system was in doubt. Three years later, the issue was
raised by the American Broadcasting Company, when it asked the FCC
for permission to launch a domestic satellite for television broadcast
distribution. The Commission thereupon invited suggestions from other
interested parties.? Many proposals were received, including one from
the Ford Foundation that recommended the establishment of a new non-
profit corporation to distribute television programs via satellite so as to
help finance an improved and expanded educational television system.
Then, early in 1970, the FCC received a policy statement from the
White House, proposing a three- to five-year test of free entry and compe-
tition in the domestic satellite field. Said the statement, in part:
In the absence of clear economies of scale and overriding pub-
lic interest considerations to the contrary, the American economy
has relied on competitive private enterprise rather than regulated
monopoly to assure technical and market innovation ...
At this stage of domestic satellite planning, it is not possible
to identify major economies of scale. Rather, it appears that a
diversity of multiple satellite systems as well as multiple earth
stations will be required to provide a full range of domestic serv-
ices.
Further, we find no public interest grounds for establishing a
monopoly in domestic satellite communications ...
Subject to appropriate conditions to preclude harmful interfer-
ence and anti-competitive practices, any financially qualified pub-
lic or private entity . . . should be permitted to establish and
operate domestic satellite facilities for its own needs; join with
related entities in common-user, cooperative facilities; establish
facilities for lease to prospective users; or establish facilities to be
used in providing specialized carrier services on a competitive
basis. . . . Common carriers should be free to establish facilities
2Act of Aug. 31, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-624, 76 Stat. 419 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 701
et seq. (1970)). For discussion of the Act, see Levin, Organization and Control of Communi-
cations Satellites, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 315 (1965); Note, The Communications Satellite Act
of 1962, 76 HARV. L. REv. 388 (1962).
3Establishment of Domestic Noncommon Carrier Comm. Satellite Facilities by
Nongovernmental Entities, Notice of Inquiry, 2 F.C.C.2d 668 (1966).
1972]
246 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIX
for either switched public message or specialized services, or
both .
31
By mid-1971, eleven parties had filed applications with the FCC for
authorizations to provide domestic satellite service.3 5 In March of 1972,
the Commission invited interested parties to comment on four specific
issues: (a) whether the Commission should adopt a policy of limited or
unrestricted open entry; (b) whether the Commission should require
Comsat to chose between owning and operating a system dedicated to
AT&T's use or owning and operating a system for the purpose of furnish-
ing services to persons other than AT&T; (c) whether AT&T should be
limited in its use of satellites to the furnishing of its noncompetitive
services (e.g., message toll telephone and wide area telephone services);
and (d) whether the Commission should require licensees to provide free
service to educational entities or leave such questions to future ratemak-
ing activities.3 6 The Commission is expected to reach a decision before
the end of 1972.
III. THE COMPETITIVE DILEMMA
Most economists would undoubtedly agree with Donald F. Turner
that
the difficulties and inadequacies of direct regulation, theoretical as
well as practical, suggest that it should be confined to cases in
which strong elements of natural monopoly are plainly present.
They also suggest that, even where some direct regulation is
thought necessary, the regulatory agency should take advantage of
whatever competitive possibilities exist.
37
The Federal Communications Commission, in its decisions to date, has
clearly adopted this general position.3 8 But in seeking to rely upon the
forces of competition to a greater extent in the future than in the past,
complex policy problems have been raised that have not received ade-
quate attention.
Market Structure. Perhaps the basic policy decision concerns the type
3'The White House, Memorandum for the Honorable Dean Burch, Chairman of the
Federal Communications Commission, January 23, 1970 (mimeographed). See generally
Final Report, President's Task Force on Communications Policy (1968) (especially chapter
5).
5 337 TELECOM. REP. 1, at 1-6. 43-62 (May 17, 1971).
31Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC Docket No. 16945 (March 17, 1972).
3 tTurner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARv.
L. REV. 1207, 1232 (1969).
-"The common carriers have responded to the competitive challenge. The Bell System,
for example, has introduced a number of new services, including Telpak and WATS (Wide
Area Telephone Service). Western Union, as noted earlier, is establishing computer centers.
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of market structure that would be the most desirable for the future devel-
opment of the domestic telecommunications industry. In a recent study,
Professors Baumol, Eckstein, and Kahn suggest that four broad types of
market structure are possible:
1. Regulated monopoly: The Federal Communications Commis-
sion may decide that, despite the many applications for entry into
the field, the advantages of maintaining intact the near-monopoly
of the Bell System justify the rejection of all or almost all of the
competitive applications.
2. Full competition with guarantees to prevent abuses: The
Commission may decide that an increase in the number of compet-
itors in the field of communication is desirabie and, accordingly,
may approve competitive applications. Full competition requires
that there be no fundamental restrictions preventing any firms that
wish to do so from competing fully and effectively. In particular,
such a policy calls for the Bell System to be authorized to engage
in effective competition as well. Of course, the policy requires
some provisions to prevent abuses in pricing practices that might
occur either deliberately or inadvertently.
3. Full competition in only certain segments of the market: A
variant of the second alternative would permit entry into only
those fields in which applicants can show that there is a reasonable
prospect that entry would make significant contributions to tech-
nology or to the variety of services available to consumers, without
resulting in unacceptable losses of efficiency or deterioration in the
quality of service. This policy would attempt to combine the stimu-
lus of competition with preservation of the resource savings that
can be achieved through economies of scale and integration avail-
able to this industry under monopoly. To make this policy more
than a disguised variant of the protected competitor policy, the
principlesof full competition just described must be applied with-
out restriction within the area.
4. "Competitors" protected from full competition: The last
possibility involves an increase in the number of firms operating
in the communications field but brings with it a variety of restric-
tions on freedom of pricing, investment, and marketing decisions
which in effect merely divide the market and prevent the competi-
tive mechanism from working. The full implications of this fourth
alternative must be understood because it is precisely the arrange-
ment one encounters in some other regulated indutries 9
31Baumol, Eckstein & Kahn, Competition and Monopoly in Telecommunications
Services 2 (November 23, 1970) (a special memorandum prepared for AT&T by a group
of economic advisors).
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On the basis of their analysis, the authors conclude that the most
reasonable national policy choice may be either maintenance of regulated
monopoly or full competition in appropriate selected areas, but they
reject completely the fourth alternative." The relevant question, they
maintain, is whether "economies of scale are so great as to outweigh the
benefits of competition. ,,41 On this empirical issue, there is little
consensus.
42
Pricing under Full Competition. A closely related policy considera-
tion concerns the Bell System's pricing scheme. For many years- nation-
wide averaging has been practiced, under which toll rates are the same
for equal distances throughout the continental United States, despite
differences in the costs involved. Such a rate structure has many impor-
tant advantages (e.g., simplicity and ease of understanding), but results
in "internal subsidization." Such a rate structure also invites selective
entry (usually referred to as "cream-skimming") into high-density, low-
cost markets.43 Thus, MCI and others seeking to enter the specialized
services segment of the telecommunications industry wish to serve such
markets. In turn, if the Bell System is to compete with such entrants, it
may be forced to sacrifice geographic rate uniformity, as the FCC has
recognized, which would tend to raise rates in low-density, high-cost
markets.44
Full competition means that methods must be devised to insure that
the common carriers do not use the power at their disposal in the monop-
oly area of their business to gain an unfair advantage over their rivals in
the competitive area. Such methods are necessary since the competitive
forces outlined earlier do not apply to all of the services offered by the
common carriers; i.e., competition for bulk communications services does
not protect local exchange or message toll telephone subscribers. Those
"The authors conclude that:
The critical defect of the admission of competitors along with the preven-
tion of full competition-which can be described as a form of government-
enforced cartelization-is that it leads to inefficiency in an industry's
performance. By preventing more efficient suppliers from competing to
get the business to which their lower incremental costs entitle them, it
ensures that industry costs will be inflated. Indeed, the central purpose of




"2See the economic testimony in Phase lB of the FCC's telephone investigation (Docket
No. 16258) as summarized in Phillips, Phase IB of the Telephone Investigation, 87 PUB.
UTIL. FORT. 20 (April 15, 1971).
"For an analysis of the cream-skimming issue, see KAHN, supra note 24, at 220-50.
"In announcing its policy of free entry by specialized carriers, for example, the Com-
mission stated that the common carriers may depart from nationwide average rate levels.
37 TELECOM. REP. 1 (June 1, 1971).
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familiar with the jurisdictional separations (cost allocation) procedures
will quickly recognize the complexity of this issue. 5
If cross-subsidization of one service by another is to be prevented, and
if competition is to be encouraged, the relevant measure of cost must be
marginal (incremental) not fully allocated.46 Fully allocated cost studies,
which have been common in rate proceedings, seek to relate the revenues
received from each service with the corresponding fully allocated (or fully
distributed) costs. Such studies, however, are subject to three basic de-
fects.
In the first place, since overhead costs are fixed and are not attributa-
ble to any particular traffic or consumer, any allocation of such costs is
largely arbitrary. Any formulas for allocating common or joint costs "are
insensitive to market factors and to differential cost behavior with
changes in the output of different classes of service. They usually express
little more than someone's intuitive notions about elementary fairness in
cost sharing. '4 7 In the second place, fully allocated cost studies are re-
trospective (i.e., based on sunk costs) and, hence, cannot be used for
pricing decisions. Because they ignore differences in demand elasticities,
such studies fail to provide a basis for deciding whether rates should be
raised or lowered. It can be readily demonstrated that if a carrier can
supply a service that is priced to cover its associated long-run marginal
cost,4" then the rates on its other services can be lowered, since the com-
mon plant costs to be borne by other consumers are reduced. In the third
place, as Leland L. Johnson has contended, the fully allocated cost crite-
rion is incompatible with liberalized freedom of entry:
The mere fact that a new entrant's rates for a particular route
or for a particular service are lower than those of the established
carrier does not indicate that the new entrant's costs are necessar-
4For a discussion of cost allocation methods, see C. PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION 153-62 (rev. ed. 1969).
4 See Baumol, The Role of Cost in the Minimum Pricing of Railroad Services, 35 J.
Bus. U. CHI. 357 (1962); Coase, The Theory of Public Utility Pricing and Its Application,
I BELL J. EcON. & MANAGEMENT SC. 113 (Spring 1970); Stelzer, Incremental Costs and
Utility Rate-Making in the Competitive Era, ABA PUBLIC UTILITY LAW SECTION 26
(1967); Wald, The Theory of Marginal Cost Pricing and Utility Rates, 79 PUB. UTIL. FORT.
15 (June 22, 1967).
7Wald, The Theory of Marginal Cost Pricing and Utility Rates, 79 PUB. UTIL. FORT.
15, 20 (June 22, 1967).
"Sometimes referred to as "complete incremental cost" or "full additional cost," the
long-run marginal cost concept includes the out-of-pocket expenses of the added service, a
portion of the common plant required by that service expansion, the required return thereon,
any increase in overhead expenses which may result from the service expansion, and a
portion of the investment required to meet the carrier's future growth. Moreover, long-run
marginal costs provide only the floor below which no rate should fall, with actual rates
above such a floor being determined by market forces.
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ily lower than the existing carrier's long-run incremental costs for
comparable service. In order to discourage uneconomic entry, it
is essential to permit the carriers to respond by adjusting their
rates toward their own incremental costs. Existing rates must not
be frozen to provide an umbrella protecting uneconomic competi-
tive activity.49
The FCC has been struggling with ratemaking principles for several
years. In concluding its investigation into the economics of pricing in
1969, the Commission said that its "Statement of Rate-Making Princi-
ples and Factors"
properly recognizes the relevance of both fully distributed and
incremental costs in considering appropriate rate levels of specific
classes of service. . . . It is the thrust of the statement that effec-
tive testing of the complex economic theories of costing and pric-
ing which have been advanced in this record, and the reconciliation
of opposing, or at least partially conflicting, views of expert wit-
nesses, can best be accomplished by relating the principles advo-
cated to specific rate proposals. 0
Other Considerations. In deciding on an appropriate market structure
for the domestic telecommunications industry, many subsidiary issues
also must be considered. These issues include the desirability of duplica-
tion of facilities; adequacy of the frequency spectrum, and the mainte-
nance of backup capacity. Consider the third-the maintenance of
backup capacity. MCI, for example, is not a common carrier. To what
extent,then,- is the Bell System-as a common carrier with a service
obligation-responsible for maintaining backup (or standby) capacity?
Equally important, who should pay for such capacity? After a careful
analysis of the MCI case, Alfred E. Kahn has concluded:
So, paradoxically, MCI's entry might well constitute cream-
skimming, but cream-skimming with the effect of introducing in-
ternal subsidization where none existed before-subsidization of
MCI's customers by AT&T's captive customers being forced to
carry a disproportionate share of the backup capacity costs.,
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Technological advances have confronted the Federal Communica-
tions Commission with some difficult policy decisions. Liberalized entry
4 Johnson, Technological Advance and Market Structure in Domestic Telecommuni-
cations, 60 AM. EcoN. REV. 204, 205-06 (Papers and Proceedings, May 1970).
"American Tel. & Tel. Co. & the Associated Bell Systems Cos., 18 F.C.C.2d 761, 763
(1969). The statement of ratemaking principles is set out at 765-69.
51KAIIN, supra note 24, at 239.
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into the domestic telecommunications industry has become possible,
thereby challenging the long-held monopoly position of the common
carriers. The diverse firms seeking to enter have one common characteris-
tic: they seek entry "in order that they may serve particular segments or
portions of the communication and teleprocessing markets. '52 They have
maintained, in support of their efforts to have restrictions on entry liber-
alized, that "they will bring a greater range of choice to the consumer,
supply services which are not currently available, and increase the range
of options in terms of leasing versus buying.
'53
In its recent decisions, the FCC has decided that such entry would be
in the public interest. Lionel Kestenbaum, after a review of those deci-
sions, has written:
No doubt, an entirely open and balanced weighing of the opposing
contentions and expectations would have permitted a judgment
either way on these issues. The Commission in effect resolved
them by putting the burden on the common carrier system to
justify the need for monopoly. Implicitly, it accepted the proposi-
tion that certain objectives of communications policy could not as
equally be assured by a monopoly carrier subject to regulatory
supervision. Or, at the least, it implemented the legal-economic
judgment that reliance upon regulation is a last resort, justified
only when competition is not feasible or practical.
54
The common carriers have had difficulty in sustaining the justification
burden. In general, they have opposed a policy of liberalized entry on the
grounds that the frequency spectrum is limited, so that entry would lead
to its wasteful use, and that the inherent duplication of facilities and
cream-skimming by entrants would be detrimental to maximum effi-
ciency (i.e., would make it difficult to achieve economies of scale) and
would result in higher rates to many subscribers.5 But to date, the com-
mon carriers have failed to persuade or convince the Commission that
these potential adverse consequences of liberalized entry outweigh the
'Trebing, supra note 3, at 313. Professor Trebing goes on to note that "[tihere appears
to be little evidence that the new entrant will challenge the established carriers in the broad
public message telephone and record markets." Id. at 314.
OId. at 313.
'Kestenbaum, "Competition in Communications," 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 769, 776
(1971).
'As Professor Trebing has pointed out:
It is also possible that potential entry will be employed by large-volume
consumers to extract special rate concessions from the carriers, thereby
placing an added burden on the monopoly services.
Trebing, supra note 3, at 313-14.
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potential advantages of introducing competitive forces, particularly in the
area of technological advance."
At the same time, the decisions reviewed in this article suggest that
the Commission has not been fully consistent. Thus, while full competi-
tion was encouraged in the specialized carrier decision, protected compe-
tition was promoted in the computer inquiry decision. Since the economic
issues were similar in each, it is hard to reconcile these two Commission
orders. Nor has the Commission ever really come to grips with such
issues as the use of the frequency spectrum or the benefits and costs of
nationwide averaging.
Perhaps inconsistency is inevitable when such complex issues continue
to be decided on a case-by-case basis. "Too often, pricing, interconnec-
tion, and other market structure variables are considered separately.
5
There is no overall domestic telecommunications policy. The FCC's case
load undoubtedly prohibits it from formulating such a policy. The Com-
mission attempted a detailed examination of pricing principles, in an
attempt to formulate a policy in that important area, but was unable to
reach a clear decision.58 It then retreated once again to the traditional
approach; that is, to looking at pricing principles with respect to a specific
rate problem. In such a setting, it is diffcult to reach policy decisions.
At a minimum, therefore, the Commission's decisions indicate that it
would be desirable to formulate such an overall policy in the near future.
5 See Shepherd, The Competitive Margin in Communications, in TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES 86 (W. Capron ed. 1971). Professor Shepherd admits,
however, that "'further research is needed on a variety of trade-offs among technological
factors, such as system integrity, reliability standards, and economies of vertical and hori-
zontal integration." Id. at 122.
5'Trebing, supra note 3, at 326. Professor Trebing noted:
Each issue continues to be considered in isolation, and there is very little
evidence to suggest that unified policies and standards will be forthcoming
in the reasonable future.
Id.
5'Tcxt accompanying note 50 supra.
"American Tel. & Tel. Co. & the Associated Bell Systems Cos., 18 F.C.C.2d 271, 769
(1969).
"Professor Trebing has suggested a systems approach to common carrier regulation.
Systems planning would seek to interrelate all variables pertaining to the
common carrier service, as well as general communications, in such a
fashion that they can be treated sequentially and cross-sectionally. Sys-
tems analysis must interrelate (I) the over-all system integrity of common
carrier communications; (2) coexistence of monopoly and competition; (3)
the need to assure an inducement to superior performance and freedom
of consumer choice; and (4) efficient use of public resources.
Trebing, supra note 3 at 326.
